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ABSTRACT 
“Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, and sorry I could not travel both” 
 
Much like the words of Robert Frost in “The Road Not Taken,” we have 
arrived at a point in the law of Fourth Amendment search analysis where two 
roads appear before us: privacy or property.  Recently, there has been a 
development in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that requires a closer 
examination of the proper direction to take.  Specifically, the issue of disputed 
consent and the appropriate search inquiry in these cases presents a crossroads 
for the Court.  What road will it choose?  Does it matter? 
Beyond this, however, exists a greater problem: what happens when the two 
rules of search—Katz expectation of privacy and Jones trespass onto property—
conflict?  What happens when the Katz rule says yes to a situation involving 
what is determined as an unreasonable search and the Jones rule says no?  Do 
we have a situation of disputed analysis in our disputed consent decisions of 
our Court?  When considering the ambit of modern search law, further 
complicated by the resurgence of the trespass test by Justice Scalia, three crucial 
observations appear: 
(1) Prior to Jones, the key inquiry in cases of third-party consent was 
grounded in terms of expectations of privacy.  In the particular situation of 
disputed consent by co-occupants, the rule was that a present objector to consent 
defeated the wishes of another co-occupant (no trumps yes).  Since Jones, 
however, Justice Scalia has called for a reconsideration of this rule in light of 
trespass.  Through his concurrence in Fernandez v. California, Justice Scalia 
declared that the police, with the consent of a co-occupant, are not liable under 
trespass when the police enter the home to search, irrespective of an objecting co-
occupant.  Much like the question of whether no trumps yes in disputed consent 
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cases, the new question for the post-Jones Court will be whether no trumps yes in 
cases of disputed search analysis. 
(2) The utilization of the current test for a Fourth Amendment search 
under a property-based framework supports Justice Scalia’s assertion that a 
consent police search is reasonable.  The police are granted a license to enter the 
property, through the consent of a co-occupant.  In light of this determination, 
the police would stand in the shoes of the grantor of the license and are immune 
from trespass, despite the objections of another co-occupant. 
(3) Because of this development, in disputed consent cases, it appears likely 
that the Court could arrive at a different conclusion depending upon which test 
for a search the Court chooses to use.  Similar to the problem of disputed consent, 
where one co-occupant says yes and the other says no, we may very well have 
arrived at a place in our Fourth Amendment understanding where disputed 
analysis, trespass or privacy, threatens to cloud an already obscured view of 
search law.  For now, we are marooned to fight over the directions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, and sorry I could not travel both”1 
 
Much like the words of Robert Frost in “The Road Not Taken,”2 
we have arrived at a point in the law of Fourth Amendment search 
analysis where two roads appear before us: privacy or property.  
Recently, there has been a development in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence that requires a closer examination of the proper 
direction to take.  Specifically, the issue of disputed consent and the 
appropriate search inquiry in these cases presents a crossroads for the 
Court.  What road will it choose?  Does it matter? 
When it comes to situations of disputed consent police searches 
of homes involving physically present co-occupants, the rule has been 
simple: no trumps yes.3  Yet, there have been some significant 
developments since the Supreme Court visited this issue in Georgia v. 
Randolph.4  Most notably, Justice Scalia in United States v. Jones has single-
handedly resurrected the property-based trespass inquiry for searches.5  
Given the resurgence of trespass analysis, would a majority of the Court 
decide a case like Randolph differently?  Would the Court abandon this 
exception that was grounded upon the privacy-based scrutiny of 
“shared social expectations”6 in favor of adopting a trespass test for 
physical intrusions in the home? 
Most recently, the Court in Fernandez v. California considered 
whether it would extend the Randolph rule to circumstances when the 
police arrest and remove the protesting co-occupant and return to seek 
consent from another occupant.7  While the Court resolves the issue by 
concluding that the rule in Randolph does not apply,8 what may be most 
 
 1  ROBERT FROST, MOUNTAIN INTERVAL 9 (1921).  
 2  FROST, supra note 1.  
 3  See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 4  See id. 
 5  132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012) (“But as we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law 
trespassory test.”).  See also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
 6  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111 (There is “great significance given to widely shared 
social expectations, which are naturally enough influenced by the law of property, but 
not controlled by its rules.”). 
 7  Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1128 (2014).  
 8  Id. at 1130. 
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notable is the separate concurrence of Justice Scalia.9  Even in its 
brevity, we see a glimpse of his trespass-based influence on Fernandez.  
But perhaps more importantly, we see how this may have very well 
influenced a different decision in Randolph10—a decision that based 
upon trespass, an objecting co-occupant would not trump the wishes 
of another consenting occupant.  If this is the case, does this mean, 
depending upon the path the Court chooses to follow, it may reach 
different conclusions where yes may trump no? 
This Article will examine the decisions of Randolph and Fernandez 
from the perspective of the newly revitalized rule of trespass through 
the lens of its reviver, Justice Scalia.  This Article will conclude that 
under the trespass-based search analysis, the police may validly search 
a home based upon the consent of a co-occupant, regardless of a 
physically present objecting co-occupant.11  Therefore, this Article will 
conclude that Randolph may have been erroneously decided, given 
today’s return to trespass law for Fourth Amendment search analysis.  
Beyond this, however, this Article presents a greater problem: what 
happens when the two rules of search—Katz expectation of privacy or 
Jones trespass onto property—conflict?  What happens when the Katz 
rule says yes to a situation involving what is determined as an 
unreasonable search and the Jones rule says no?  Much like the 
conflicting co-occupants scenario in both Fernandez and Randolph, does 
no trump yes to determine if there was an unreasonable search? 
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of how the Fourth 
Amendment has defined a search.  In it, we see the shift from a 
property-based analysis founded under physical trespass to a privacy-
based analysis, heralded into existence by the decision in Katz v. United 
States.12  Later, the Article examines the return to prominence of the 
trespass test to define a search in the Justice Scalia majority opinions 
of Jones and Florida v. Jardines.13  These developments to the law of 
search provide the impetus to revisit the issue raised in Randolph. 
Part II presents the crossroads of search analysis through the cases 
 
 9  Id. at 113738 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 10  Id. at 1137 (“I believe Georgia v. Randolph was wrongly decided.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 11  There could be a variety of ways to describe the relationship between the parties 
and their interests to the property (co-tenant, tenant in common, etc.) as 
contemplated by the Court in this examination.  I will use the term “occupant” or “co-
occupant” throughout this Article to describe an individual who possesses “common 
authority” over the property.  See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 
(1974). 
 12  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 13  133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
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of disputed consent as a guide.  It examines the decisions of Randolph 
(pre-Jones) and Fernandez (post-Jones) together and concludes that 
Justice Scalia’s trespass analysis provides an alternate rationale to the 
decisions. 
Part III of this Article proposes that if the trespass analysis is here 
to stay in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it could significantly alter 
the way we view search law and could threaten to further obscure our 
understanding of administrable rules under property or privacy.  This 
part explains how the police may properly search a home based on 
consent over an objecting co-occupant.  Using an understanding of 
property as the lens, an objecting co-tenant may not claim trespass 
against a person who is licensed by another co-tenant to enter the 
home.  Finally, this Article suggests that because of the potential for 
opposing results, depending on the test used to access the meaning of 
a search, we may have reached a claim of disputed analysis that requires 
immediate resolution. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME AND PRIVATE SPACE: THE LAW OF 
SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
“Then took the other, as just as fair, and perhaps the better claim.”14 
 
To attempt to plot the course of the Supreme Court’s 
understanding of the law of searches is, in no small measure, a 
Herculean task.  While the Fourth Amendment’s text provides in plain 
terms “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,”15 the 
journey towards defining what constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment is fraught with twists and turns.16  Over time, three distinct 
paths emerged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14  See FROST, supra note 1, at 9. 
 15  See U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 16  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757, 759 (1994) (“Fourth Amendment case law is a sinking ocean liner—rudderless 
and badly off course . . . .”). 
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A.  In the Beginning, Trespass Was King17 
Prior to Katz, the test for a Fourth Amendment search was a 
property-based question18: whether the government physically 
intruded into a constitutionally protected area.19  The origin of the test 
can be traced back to an understanding of the English law of trespass.20  
Often repeated in both pre-Katz cases, as well as in the Scalia version 
of trespass in Jones, is the English case of Entick v. Carrington.21  The 
Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States22 made clear that Entick’s 
“celebrated judgment,”23 denouncing the practice of general warrant 
searches in private homes, was so monumental that “its propositions 
were in the minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution, and were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what 
was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.”24  It was under this 
view that “every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a 
trespass.”25 
Despite this broad proclamation of constitutional protections 
under trespass, the Court has grappled with the contours of the 
meaning of an actionable invasion of private property, often 
producing rigid results.  In what appeared to be two very similar factual 
scenarios of government monitoring of conversations taking place on 
private property, the Court held in Goldman v. United States26 that the 
monitoring of an office was not a violation under the Fourth 
Amendment, but in Silverman v. United States27 that the monitoring of a 
gambling establishment was actionable. 
 
 17  See Arnold H. Loewy, United States v. Jones: Return to Trespass—Good News or Bad, 
82 MISS. L.J. 879, 879 (2013) (“For the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, trespass 
was king in regard to Fourth Amendment searches.”). 
 18  But see Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. 
CT. REV. 67 (2012) (discussing that “no trespass test was used in the pre-Katz era”). 
 19  Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142 (1962) (determining whether a visitor’s 
room of a jail qualifies as a “constitutionally protected area”). 
 20  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 
19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765)) (“By the laws of England, every invasion of private 
property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.  No man can set his foot upon my ground 
without my license, . . . which is proved by every declaration in trespass where the 
defendant is called upon to answer for bruising the grass and even treading upon the 
soil.”). 
 21  19 How. St. Tr. at 1029. 
 22  Genealogical research by the author of this Article has not revealed a familial 
connection between the author and the claimant of the thirty-five cases of plate glass.   
 23  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627. 
 24  Id. at 626–27. 
 25  Id. at 627–28 (quoting Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1029). 
 26  316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
 27  365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
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In both cases, the government gathered incriminating 
information by listening to conversations coming from a private area.28  
The difference in these two contradictory outcomes was not the type 
of room that was monitored; rather, it was whether or not the 
government physically intruded into the area.29  In the case of 
Silverman, it came down to a matter of inches.30 
Prior to Silverman, the Court ruled that the placement of a sound 
amplification listening device against a common wall in order to hear 
the private conversations of the suspects was not a search.31  In 
Silverman, however, the Court found a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment when the government inserted a listening device several 
inches into a common wall.32  A physical intrusion occurred when the 
device made contact with a heating duct belonging to the suspect’s 
property.33  While the Court considered in dicta the potential threats 
to privacy due to advances in eavesdropping technology,34 it 
distinguished this case from Goldman because of the “reality of an 
actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.”35 
This reality of an actual intrusion trespass test often produced 
absurd results.  The Court continued to allow the government 
monitoring of private property, so long as there was no physical 
trespass.  In Olmstead v. United States, the government did not seek a 
warrant and installed wiretaps into the telephone wires of at least four 
homes and an office of individuals suspected of conspiring to violate 
prohibition laws.36  Despite the fact that the government listened in on 
the private calls from the homes for a period of many months, the 
Olmstead Court ruled that the government did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.37  Again, the rationale for this decision was that the 
government action did not amount to a trespass since the wiretaps 
were placed on telephone lines outside of the suspects’ homes.38  The 
Court, applying an unbending formalism to the view of searches, 
 
 28  Silverman, 365 U.S. at 505; Goldman, 316 U.S. at 129. 
 29  Silverman, 365 U.S. at 505; Goldman, 316 U.S. at 129.  
 30  Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512.  
 31  Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131. 
 32  Silverman, 365 U.S. at 506. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Id. at 508–09. 
 35  Id. at 512. 
 36  277 U.S. 438, 456 (1928). 
 37  Id. at 466. 
 38  Id. at 465 (“By the invention of the telephone, fifty years ago, and its application 
for the purpose of extending communications, one can talk with another at a far 
distant place.”). 
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explained that the “language of the amendment cannot be extended 
and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world 
from the defendant’s house or office.  The intervening wires are not 
part of his house or office, any more than are the highways along which 
they are stretched.”39 
While decisions like Goldman and Olmstead controlled the law of 
searches during this time, there would appear some signs along the 
way to suggest a possible change of direction.  Justice Douglas, in his 
concurrence in Silverman, suggested that a fork in the road was on the 
horizon.40  The wrong was not trespass.  Instead, the wrong involved an 
invasion of privacy “when the intimacies of the home were tapped, 
recorded, or revealed.”41  We would not have to wait long before the 
Court embarked on this new heading. 
B. The King Is Dead!  Long Live Privacy and the Katz Test 
With one swift blow, the Katz Court effectively eradicated the 
trespass test.42  Prior to the 1967 decision of Katz, it seemed that the 
rule limiting a search to a physical invasion into a constitutionally 
protected area would continue to control.  In Katz, the government 
sought to intercept telephone communications by attaching a listening 
device to the outside of a public telephone booth.43  Relying upon the 
precedent of Olmstead and Goldman, the government contended that a 
Fourth Amendment search was not implicated since the agents never 
physically penetrated the telephone booth.44  Even the petitioner in 
Katz framed the issue before the Court as a question of trespass.45 
In a dramatic change of direction, the Court embraced a privacy-
based test over the property-based trespass analysis as it proclaimed 
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”46  In addressing 
the government’s contention that this case should be controlled by 
 
 39  Id.  
 40  Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 41  Id. (“Rather our sole concern should be with whether the privacy of the home 
was invaded.”).  
 42  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
 43  Id. at 348. 
 44  Id. at 352. 
 45  Id. at 34950 (declining to answer the questions presented to the Court of 
“[w]hether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that 
evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening recording device to the top of 
such a booth is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth” 
and “[w]hether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary 
before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution”). 
 46  Id. at 351. 
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Olmstead and Goldman, the Katz Court responded that the “premise that 
property interests control the right of the Government to search and 
seize has been discredited.”47  When the Court concluded that “the 
underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our 
subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can 
no longer be regarded as controlling,”48 it appeared as though the 
trespass test was dead.49 
Instead of focusing on whether the government intruded into a 
constitutionally protected area, the Katz search test inquired into 
whether an individual has a constitutionally protected expectation of 
privacy.50  Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz provided the clearest 
explanation of the privacy-based inquiry: the Fourth Amendment is 
triggered when there is government action involving a defendant 
exhibiting both an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and a 
reasonable (objective) expectation of privacy.51  Even though both 
requirements must be met, the landscape of search law post-Katz 
turned on whether there was a reasonable52 (or legitimate) expectation 
of privacy.53  While it is clear Katz signaled a seismic shift in the law of 
searches, its full impact has yet to be completely realized,54 particularly 
 
 47  Id. at 353 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible 
items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements overheard without any 
‘technical trespass under . . . local property law.’”) (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted).  
 48  Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.  
 49  But see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004) (“While existing 
scholarship often interprets the shift as a wholesale rejection of property-based 
principles in Fourth Amendment law, it is better understood as a shift of degree from 
common law rules to the looser property-based approach that currently governs.”).  
 50  Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 51  Id. at 361 (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
 52  See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 
504 (2007) (concluding that “the reasonable expectation of privacy test is the central 
mystery of Fourth Amendment law”). 
 53  See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in police inspection of curtilage of home from a helicopter flying at 400 feet); 
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
garbage left on street curb); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in police inspection of curtilage of home from a fixed-wing 
aircraft flying at 1000 feet); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745 (1971) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in confiding in an informant who 
was carrying a radio transmitter). 
 54  See James T. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision 
of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 647 (1985) (“Katz merely 
BOYD (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2015  11:22 AM 
10 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
now that the trespass test has come back from the dead. 
C. It’s Alive! Justice Scalia Resurrects Trespass Through Jones and 
Jardines 
Like any good horror movie involving a villain that will not die,55 
the law of trespass surprisingly comes back to life56 to wreak havoc on 
the landscape of search jurisprudence.  “This time it’s personal.”57  It is 
personal because Justice Scalia is the person most responsible for 
breathing life back into the trespass test.58  While the Court 
unanimously concluded that the government’s installation of a global 
positioning system (“GPS”) device to a suspect’s vehicle constituted a 
search under the Fourth Amendment, the 2012 Jones decision marked 
a considerable rift in how the Justices consider modern search law.59 
Prior to Jones, the installation and electronic monitoring of a 
vehicle on public roads through a GPS tracker was not a search under 
the Fourth Amendment.60  The rationale behind the rule was based 
upon the Court’s use of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test 
in the pre-GPS technology beeper cases of Unites States v. Knotts61 and 
 
began the revolution, presenting the challenge of understanding and defining fourth 
amendment privacy and developing workable doctrine.”).  
 55  Jason Voorhees from Friday the 13th and Freddy Krueger from A Nightmare on 
Elm Street come to mind. 
 56  See, e.g., Jace C. Gatewood, It’s Raining Katz and Jones: The Implications of United 
States v. Jones—A Case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV. 683, 690 (2013) (“[M]any were 
left utterly shocked by the Court’s almost total rejection” of the Court’s decision in 
Katz and other authorities “in favor of a doctrine that most believed was dead—the 
‘trespass doctrine.’”). 
 57  See JAWS: THE REVENGE (Universal Pictures July 17, 1987) (promoting the film 
with the tagline, “this time it’s personal”); See also, BACK TO THE FUTURE: PART II 
(Universal Pictures Nov. 22, 1989) (involving a scene of a theater showing the fictitious 
film Jaws 19 with the tagline, “this time it’s REALLY personal”).  
 58  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–50 (2012).  See also Florida v. 
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).  
 59  See Nancy Forster, Back to the Future: United States v. Jones Resuscitates Property Law 
Concepts in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 445, 446–47 (2013) 
(Justice Scalia’s insistence that property law concepts had never died “will no doubt 
come as a surprise to many in the legal community, including fellow Supreme Court 
justices, who thought the use of property law, and more specifically the doctrine of 
trespass, in the Fourth Amendment context had been overruled by the Court in Katz 
v. United States.”).  
 60  See United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187, 229 (3d Cir. 2013) (Van Antwerpen, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (Prior to Jones there was “a uniform consensus 
across the federal courts of appeals to address the issue that the installation and 
subsequent use of GPS or GPS-like devices was not a search or, at most, was as search 
but did not require a warrant.”).  
 61  460 U.S. 276 (1983).  
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Unites States v. Karo.62  The Knotts Court equated the use of tracking the 
movements of a vehicle on the public highways by following the beeper 
signals to that of police visual surveillance and concluded that an 
individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
travels.63 
Much like the impact of the Katz decision that surprised the legal 
community over forty years ago, Justice Scalia changed the course of 
modern search law with his opinion in Jones.64  Writing for the five-
justice majority,65 Justice Scalia concluded the government’s 
installation of a GPS device underneath the defendant’s Jeep while it 
was parked in a public parking lot and subsequent twenty-eight day 
monitoring of the vehicle’s movements amounted to a search.66  
Instead of relying upon the reasonable expectation of privacy test in 
Katz, Justice Scalia directed the Court back to a property-based 
analysis.67 
With one swift blow, Justice Scalia introduced a “new” test under 
the Fourth Amendment: a search occurs when the government 
commits a trespass into a constitutionally protected area68 for the 
purpose of obtaining information.69  Citing previous property-based 
decisions of the Court such as Entick,70 Boyd,71 and Olmstead,72 Justice 
Scalia concluded that the “Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test 
 
 62  468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 63  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (“[A] person travelling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one 
place to another.”).  But see Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (determining that the “monitoring 
of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance” amounts 
to a search that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 64  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 65  Id. (Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate concurring opinion while Justice Alito, 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan, wrote an opinion concurring in the 
judgment.). 
 66  Id. at 948–49. 
 67  Id. at 950 (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood 
to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, 
houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates.  Katz did not repudiate that 
understanding.”) (footnote omitted).  
 68  It would seem here that Justice Scalia did not necessarily embrace the full 
understanding of the English common law understanding from Entick that “every 
invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.”  Instead, Justice Scalia’s 
view of the property interest (a constitutionally protected area) would include only 
those areas of property that touch on the enumerated commands of the Fourth 
Amendment (“persons, houses, papers, and effects”).  See id. at 949.   
 69  Id. 
 70  Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765). 
 71  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 72  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”73  
It seemed that Justice Scalia did not seek to create a new test.  Instead, 
he sought to remind the Court of a time when the law of property74 
informed the understanding of the Fourth Amendment.75 
Not everyone on the Court shared Justice Scalia’s enthusiasm for 
the reintroduction of the trespass test.  Writing a concurrence in the 
judgment only, and joined by three other Justices, Justice Alito scoffed 
at the trespass rationale presented by Justice Scalia and the majority.76  
Instead, Justice Alito rejected the attempt to couch the issue of search 
in property terms77 and urged that the decision was properly decided 
under Katz “by asking whether respondent’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy rights were violated by the long-term monitoring of the vehicle 
he drove.”78 
While Justice Sotomayor joined with the Scalia majority rationale 
as the fifth vote, she penned a separate concurrence that accepted 
Justice Scalia’s trespass test to resolve the immediate issue in Jones.79  At 
the same time, however, she expressed doubts about the utility of the 
trespass test in many situations involving the lack of physical invasion 
and reaffirmed that the Katz analysis will often be more appropriate in 
determining modern search law.80  Justice Sotomayor went further, 
however, and expressed grave concerns over short-term GPS 
monitoring, in contrast to Justice Alito’s acceptance of the practice.81  
Even more significantly, Justice Sotomayor called into question the 
notion that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
 
 73  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.  
 74  Id. at 949 (stating that “the text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close 
connection to property” and that “our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to 
common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century”). 
 75  But see Brian Sawers, Keeping Up with the Joneses: Making Sure Your History Is Just as 
Wrong as Everyone Else’s, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 26 (Feb. 2013) (“Both 
the majority and concurring opinions in Jones are wrong about the state of the law in 
1791 [regarding trespass].”).  
 76  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (The Jones majority holding “strains 
the language of the Fourth Amendment; it has little if any support in current Fourth 
Amendment case law; and it is highly artificial.”). 
 77  Id. at 960 (“The premise that property interests control the right of the 
Government to search and seizure has been discredited.”) (citations omitted).  
 78  Id. at 958.  
 79  Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 80  Id. (stating that “the majority opinion’s trespassory test may provide little 
guidance” in situations of electronic surveillance that do not involve a physical 
penetration and that these kind of situations would “remain subject to Katz analysis”).  
 81  Id. (addressing that due to the nature of the kind of information made available 
by GPS monitoring such as details about an individual’s “familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations,” the “Katz analysis will require 
particular attention”). 
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the information disclosed to third parties.82  In considering the “digital 
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks,”83 Justice Sotomayor did not simply re-affirm Katz.  Instead, she 
may have suggested another “new” test to enhance privacy under Katz.84 
After Jones, the test for a search doubled in size and complexity.  
Many questions emerged from Justice Scalia’s salvo.  Which test 
controls the law of search: Katz, Jones, or both?  Is one test more 
appropriate depending upon the facts and circumstances presented in 
a given situation?  Many wondered if the trespass test would fade back 
into history.  It would take a mere fourteen months to learn from the 
Court’s opinion in Jardines that the trespass test is here to stay for the 
time being. 
For the first time since the Court’s 1967 decision in Katz, there 
existed a real question as to what test for a search should control: 
property or privacy.  Specifically, the Jardines Court wrestled with the 
issue of the government’s use of a drug-sniffing dog on the front porch 
of a home for the purpose of investigating a potential grow house.85  
The Court in a 5-4 decision held that the government’s actions did, in 
fact, constitute a search.86  How the Court reached this decision, 
however, showed the marked divide between the Justices. 
Relying on his most recent search decision in Jones, Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion utilized the property-based test of trespass87 and 
determined that the government committed a search when it 
physically intruded into a constitutionally protected area for the 
purpose of obtaining information.88  In doing so, he reaffirmed the 
primacy of the home under the Fourth Amendment89 and recognized 
the extension of the home’s protection to the curtilage.90  Justice Scalia 
 
 82  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 83  Id.  
 84  Id; see also Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The Curious Case of United States v. Jones, 
10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 333–36 (2012) (arguing that Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence represents a “super-Katz” view).  
 85  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013). 
 86  Id. at 1417–18 (“The government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the 
home and its immediate surroundings is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”).  
 87  But see Laurent Sacharoff, Constitutional Trespass, 81 TENN. L. REV. 877, 879 
(2014) (suggesting that the Jardines majority “shrink[s] from the use of the word 
‘trespass’”).  
 88  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–50). 
 89  Id. at 1414 (“[T]he home is first among equals.”).  
 90  Id. (“[T]he area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the home’—
what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment 
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concluded the government’s investigation amounted to an 
“unlicensed physical intrusion” on the porch, which was within the 
constitutionally protected area of the curtilage.91  Consequently, the 
intrusion equated to a Fourth Amendment search.92 
While Justice Scalia acknowledged the existence of the Katz 
privacy test generally, he refused to apply it to the Jardines facts.93  
Instead, he announced a clear preference for the trespass test under 
the facts by stating that “[o]ne virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s 
property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.”94 
Other Justices in the majority, however, were uncomfortable not 
giving Katz its due.  Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor, wrote a separate concurrence to Jardines.95  Rather than 
apply a single test for a search, Justice Kagan emphasized that both 
standards were satisfied.96  She justified the use of both tests due to the 
closely aligned property and privacy interests in the case of a home 
search97 and stated: “Was this activity a trespass?  Yes, as the Court holds 
today.  Was it also an invasion of privacy?  Yes, that as well.”98 
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy 
and Breyer, ridiculed both the majority and concurring opinions’ 
application of the law of search, irrespective of the test chosen.99  In his 
dissent, Justice Alito declared that the government’s activity did not 
amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment.100  While he 
criticized the majority Justices’ Katz and Jones analysis to the facts, 
Justice Alito reserved his sharpest criticism for the trespass test when 
he declared that Justice Scalia’s decision was “based on a putative rule 
of trespass law that is nowhere to be found in the annals of Anglo-
American jurisprudence.”101 
The trespass test for a search remains viable and was utilized as 
recently as this past term by the Court.102  In a per curiam decision, the 
 
purposes.’”) (citation omitted).  
 91  Id. at 1415. 
 92  Id. at 1417–18. 
 93  Id. at 1417. 
 94  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 (“That the officers learned what they learned only by 
physically intruding on Jardines’ property to gather evidence is enough to establish 
that a search occurred.”).  
 95  Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id. at 1419 (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S 103, 111 (2006)).  
 98  Id. at 1418. 
 99  Id. at 1420 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 100  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1421. 
 101  Id. at 1420. 
 102  See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015) (per curiam). 
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Court in Grady v. North Carolina determined North Carolina’s satellite-
based monitoring of recidivist sex offenders constituted a search under 
the Fourth Amendment.103  In reaching its decision, the Court 
reaffirmed the trespass test under Jones and Jardines and concluded 
“[i]n light of these decisions, it follows that a State also conducts a 
search when it attaches a device to a person’s body, without consent, 
for the purpose of tracking that individual’s movements.”104  Without 
mention of the privacy test of Katz, the Court based its conclusion that 
the conduct in Grady amounted to a search solely on the trespass test 
where the government physically intruded upon a suspect’s body for 
the purpose of obtaining information.105 
In light of the current state of search law, we have arrived at a 
crossroads.  As the Court encounters the question of whether the 
government’s activity implicates the Fourth Amendment, what path 
will it choose in future cases?  Depending upon the particular factual 
circumstances, will the Court determine that one test is not applicable 
and apply a different test inevitably?  For example, will the Court use 
exclusively the Jones test for physical invasions but use the Katz test to 
potential searches not involving a physical trespass?106  Or will the Court 
apply both tests for a search, similar to the approach utilized by Justice 
Kagan’s concurrence in Jardines?  If the Court attempts to use both 
tests, what if the tests produce inconsistent results that require 
immediate resolution?  If Katz says yes but Jones says no, what should be 
the result?  Consider these questions through the lens of the disputed 
consent cases of Randolph107 and Fernandez.108  It seems that the view may 
be particularly murky. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 103  Id. at 1370. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. at 1371.  The Court, however, did not reach a decision as to whether the 
government committed an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.  
 106  See id. 
 107  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 108  Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014). 
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II. THE PATH OF SEARCH LAW ARRIVES AT A FORK IN THE ROAD.  DOES 
NO TRUMP YES?: THE CURIOUS CASE OF DISPUTED CONSENT AS GUIDE 
“And both that morning equally lay in leaves no step had trodden black.”109 
 
The text110 of the Fourth Amendment suggests,111 and a number of 
leading decisions from the Court have determined,112 that 
governmental searches and seizures require a warrant to pass 
constitutional scrutiny, “subject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions.”113  Over the years, the Court has 
grappled114 with the issue of whether warrants should be required in 
search cases or if the key inquiry is whether the government acted 
reasonably under the circumstances.115 
Despite the debate, the reality is that the exceptions to obtaining 
a warrant are “neither few nor well-delineated.”116  One of the most 
 
 109  See FROST, supra note 1, at 9. 
 110  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”).   
 111  But see Amar, supra note 16, at 759 (“We need to read the Amendment’s words 
and take them seriously: they do not require warrants, probable cause, or exclusion of 
evidence, but they do require that all searches and seizures be reasonable.”).  
 112  See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“‘Over and again this 
Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires 
adherence to judicial processes,’ and that searches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment . . . .”) (citations omitted) (first alteration in original).  
 113  Id.  
 114  See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“[O]ur jurisprudence lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant 
requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.”); id. at 583 (“In my view, the path 
out of this confusion should be sought by returning to the first principle that the 
‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that 
the common law afforded.”).  
 115  It seems that the reasonableness approach is the most often repeated 
justification for searches and seizures as seen in two of the most recent Fourth 
Amendment cases before the Court.  See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 
(2014) (“As the text makes clear, ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment 
is ‘reasonableness.’’”) (citations omitted).  See also Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 
530, 536 (2014) (“To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment 
allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway 
for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’”) (citations omitted). 
 116  See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 
1473–75 (explaining that “[t]here are over twenty exceptions to the probable cause or 
the warrant requirement or both” and that “[t]he reason that all of these exceptions 
have grown up is simple: the clear rule that warrants are required is unworkable and 
to enforce it would lead to exclusion of evidence in many cases where the police activity 
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common exceptions to the warrant requirement, establishing that the 
police acted “reasonabl[y],” is consent.117  As the rules for consent have 
developed over time,118 the most often litigated situations occur in the 
context of “third-party” consent.119  In particular, though, the most 
intriguing cases have appeared within the framework of disputed 
consent between co-occupants, such as in the cases of Randolph120 and 
Fernandez.121  In these two cases, the Court struggled to answer under 
the circumstances when one co-occupant says yes to a search, but 
another says no. 
In all cases of third-party consent, the key inquiry, to date, has 
been grounded in terms of privacy.122  The Court has evolved in its view 
of privacy and the motivation supporting its holdings.123  Through 
much of its history until Fernandez, the Court did not consider any 
other basis to support its views.  To be sure, there has been some 
discussion of property in the cases of consent; however, it has been 
limited to a Katz understanding of the relationship between property 
and the Fourth Amendment.124 
Of course, prior to Jones, there was no reason to think any other 
way than in terms of privacy.  Then came Jones.  Has Jones, and Justice 
Scalia’s property-based analysis specifically, changed the way we should 
view the disputed consent cases of Randolph and Fernandez? 
 
was essentially reasonable”). 
 117  See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (2014) (“A warrantless consent 
search is reasonable and thus consistent with the Fourth Amendment irrespective of 
the availability of a warrant.”); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184–85 
(1990). 
 118  See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Davis v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).   
 119  See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974) (stating the authority 
“clearly indicates that the consent of one who possesses common authority over 
premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that 
authority is shared”); see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 (extending the consent rule in 
that the police may lawfully conduct a warrantless entry of a home based upon the 
consent of an individual whom the police “reasonably (though erroneously) believe 
that the person who has consented to their entry is a resident of the premises”).  
 120  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S 103 (2006). 
 121  134 S. Ct. at 1126. 
 122  See, e.g., Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 190. 
 123  Compare Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170–71 (citing its decision of Frazier v. Cupp, 394 
U.S. 731 (1969) and utilizing an “assumption of the risk” approach), with Rodriguez, 
497 U.S. at 179, 188 (utilizing a “reasonableness” standard when the police reasonably 
believe an individual has “common authority” to consent) and Randolph, 547 U.S. at 
111 (utilizing a “widely shared social expectations” approach).  
 124  See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 110 (“Consistent with our prior understanding that 
Fourth Amendment rights are not limited by the law of property . . . .”) (citing  Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967) for comparison).  
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A.  Georgia v. Randolph (Pre-Jones): No Trumps Yes in Disputed 
Consent 
In 2006, the Court resolved the case of disputed consent to search 
a home in Georgia v. Randolph.125  Prior to Randolph, however, several 
circuit courts had considered and determined that the consent of an 
individual was valid, despite a present protestor to consent.126  In 
Randolph, the Court considered a case that began when the police 
responded to a marital dispute at the Randolph home.127  Once the 
police arrived, the respondent’s wife, Janet, complained that her 
husband was abusing cocaine and that she feared he would take their 
son away from her.128  Soon, the respondent arrived and disputed 
Janet’s allegations.129  Instead, he offered that it was Janet who had a 
substance abuse problem.130  Janet maintained her accusations against 
the respondent and told the police that there was evidence of 
respondent’s drug use in the home.131 
An officer first asked the respondent for consent to search the 
home.132  The respondent, an attorney, refused the request.133  Next, 
the officer asked Janet for consent to search, and she responded 
affirmatively.134  Once inside the home, Janet took the officer upstairs 
to the respondent’s bedroom.135  There, the officer observed a drinking 
straw containing traces of what appeared to be cocaine.136  The officer 
seized the straw and later sought a search warrant to search the 
premises for further evidence.137  As a result of the initial evidence 
obtained by the consent of Janet and the later search of the home 
pursuant to a valid warrant, the respondent was charged with drug 
 
 125  Id. at 103. 
 126  See, e.g., United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Morning, 64 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 1995); Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540 (11th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 
882 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 
1977). 
 127  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107. 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id.  
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id.  
 133  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107. 
 134  Id.  
 135  Id.  Janet told the officer that she and her son had been staying away from the 
home for several weeks and that she had returned recently.  In addition, she informed 
the officer the bedroom was the respondent’s.   
 136  Id.  
 137  Id.  Interestingly, Janet withdrew her consent shortly after the officer seized the 
drinking straw. 
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possession.138 
The precise issue before the Randolph Court was “whether one 
occupant may give law enforcement effective consent to search shared 
premises, as against a co-tenant who is present and states a refusal to 
permit a search.”139  Instead of following the wave of circuit court 
decisions supporting such a search, the Court held140 that under the 
circumstances here “a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal 
to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search 
unreasonable and invalid as to [respondent].”141 
The basis of Justice Souter’s majority opinion appeared to be both 
a continuation and evolution of the Court’s prior third-party consent 
decisions,142 such as United States v. Matlock143 and Illinois v. Rodriguez.144  
Justice Souter maintained that the proper analysis relied upon a 
consideration of what was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
by a view of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy.145  His 
opinion considered the relationship between property and privacy but 
concluded, much like the earlier Katz Court, that while property rights 
may be considered, they are not to serve as a limitation146 to the broader 
implications of privacy.147 
The majority opinion, however, took the foundation of privacy 
law and built upon it a newly advanced theory of “widely shared social 
expectations.”148  Citing the social guest case of Minnesota v. Olson149 for 
 
 138  Id.  
 139  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 108. 
 140  Id. at 105.  The Court’s decision was divided 5-3, with Justice Souter writing the 
majority opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Breyer.  Chief 
Justice Roberts, in his first term on the Court, filed his first dissent, which was joined 
by Justice Scalia.  Additionally, Justices Scalia and Thomas filed separate dissents.  
Justice Alito assumed office on January 31, 2006, but did not participate in the opinion.  
 141  Id. at 106.  
 142  Id. at 109–10.  
 143  415 U.S. 164 (1974). 
 144  497 U.S. 177 (1990). 
 145  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 110–11. 
 146  Id. at 110 (Citing Katz, Justice Souter explained that “[c]onsistent with our prior 
understanding that Fourth Amendment rights are not limited by the law of 
property . . . the third party’s ‘common authority’ is not synonymous with a technical 
property interest . . . .”).  
 147  Id. (“The common authority that counts under the Fourth Amendment may 
thus be broader that the rights accorded by property law . . . .”).  
 148  Id. at 111 (“The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness in the consent cases, then, is the great significance given to widely 
shared social expectations, which are naturally enough influenced by the law of 
property, but not controlled by its rules.”).  
 149  495 U.S. 91 (1990). 
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the proposition that an overnight guest to a home has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy,150 Justice Souter concluded that a “co-inhabitant 
naturally has an even stronger claim.”151  From this, Justice Souter 
theorized a variety of situations that would suggest a third-party could 
not be authorized to enter a home over the objections of a co-
occupant.152 
Interestingly, Justice Breyer’s separate concurrence presented an 
alternative, yet opposite, conclusion of his fellow majority Justices.  
There, he suggested that if the Court was required to choose between 
“two bright-line rules,” one that always allowed for a search when one 
occupant consents and the other that never allowed for a search, he 
preferred the former.153  He based his understanding upon the need 
for police to search in exigent circumstances as well as the diminution 
of an expectation of privacy between co-occupants.154  Nevertheless, 
Justice Breyer supported the majority because the Fourth Amendment 
“does not insist upon bright-line rules.”155 
Chief Justice Roberts strenuously dissented.156  He criticized the 
“widely shared social expectations” standard and accused the majority 
of providing Fourth Amendment protection “on a random and 
happenstance basis.”157  In Chief Justice Roberts’s view, the majority’s 
“widely shared social expectations” understanding of privacy failed to 
provide a “promising foundation on which to ground a constitutional 
rule.”158  Like the majority, Chief Justice Roberts positioned his analysis 
of disputed consent on privacy grounds;159 however, he relied upon the 
Court’s earlier “assumption of the risk” justification160 and declared 
 
 150  In Olson, the police executed a warrantless entry into the home of another in 
order to arrest Olson.  The opinion stated the police neither obtained consent to enter 
nor possessed an exigency to dispense with the warrant requirement. See id. at 93, 101.  
 151  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113. 
 152  Id. (“[I]t is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would 
have no confidence that one occupant’s invitation was a sufficiently good reason to 
enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, ‘stay out.’  Without some very good 
reason, no sensible person would go inside under those conditions.”).  
 153  Id. at 125 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 154  Id. 
 155  Id.  
 156  Id. at 127 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 157  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 127 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (condemning the 
inconsistent application of the majority’s rule protection for “a co-occupant who 
happens to be at the front door when the other occupant consents to a search, but not 
one napping or watching television in the next room”).   
 158  Id. at 130. 
 159  But see id. at 131 (“Whatever social expectation the majority seeks to protect, it 
is not one of privacy.”). 
 160  See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (deciding there is no 
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“[i]f an individual shares information, papers, or places with another, 
he assumes the risk that the other person will in turn share access to 
that information or those papers or places with the government.”161 
Justice Scalia joined the dissenters but also filed a brief dissent of 
his own.162  At the time of his dissent in Randolph, it is doubtful that 
many would have considered his remarks as instructive.  Through 
hindsight, however, Justice Scalia’s dissent provided an opening volley 
to those that would later witness the resurrection of the property-based 
test for searches.  Justice Scalia reminded the Court that “[f]rom the 
date of its ratification until well into the 20th century, violation of the 
[Fourth] Amendment was tied to common-law trespass.”163  He 
maintained, “someone who had power to license the search of a house 
by a private party could authorize a police search.”164  This signaled a 
potential for differing result in Randolph, depending on the test used 
to establish a Fourth Amendment search. 
Perhaps the members of the Court, including Justice Scalia, could 
not have fully imagined the cloudy horizon ahead in light of Jones and 
its impact on the law of search.  Unfortunately, Fernandez v. California 
provides further obscurity. 
B. Fernandez v. California (Post-Jones): Yes Trumps No When the 
Objector Is Arrested and Removed from the Scene 
Because of the Randolph decision, the rule involving consent of 
physically present co-occupants was clear: no trumped yes.  By the time 
the police arrived at a Los Angeles apartment door in 2009, it was also 
clear to the occupant, Walter Fernandez, what the rule was when he 
exclaimed: “You don’t have any right to come in here.  I know my 
rights.”165  In the span of one hour, however, Fernandez was arrested 
and removed from the scene, and the police had returned to the 
apartment and obtained consent to search the home from another 
occupant.166  How the police officers and Fernandez got to this moment 
requires explaining. 
Fernandez was suspected of an earlier gang related robbery.167  
 
justifiable expectation of privacy in confiding in “false friends”—government agents 
or informants—who are recording their conversations). 
 161  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 128 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 162  Id. at 142 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 163  Id. at 143. 
 164  Id.  
 165  Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (2014) (citation omitted).  
 166  Id. 
 167  Id.  
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Later, officers were dispatched to investigate the crime, and an 
individual bystander indicated that a potential suspect was “in the 
apartment.”168  While there, the officers noticed a man running toward 
the building identified by the witness as the respondent.169  Moments 
later, the officers heard sounds that they associated with fighting and 
screaming coming from the direction of the apartment building.170  
The police approached the door to the apartment, where they thought 
they had heard the furor, and attempted to contact the occupants.171  
A woman, identified as Roxanne Rojas, opened the door and spoke 
with the police.172 
The officers noticed that Rojas appeared to have been involved in 
a recent altercation and that she exhibited signs of physical injury.173  
The officers asked Rojas if there was anyone else in the residence, and 
she explained that no one else was there except for the baby in her 
arms and her four-year-old son.174  Despite her claims, the police 
requested that Rojas come out of the apartment so that the police 
could conduct a “protective sweep”175 of the apartment.176  Before the 
police invaded the apartment, Fernandez emerged from the domicile 
and uttered his “rights” as detailed above.177 
Based upon the evidence obtained from the frightened bystander 
earlier and the officers’ personal observations of the injuries sustained 
by Rojas, the officers arrested Fernandez and transported him to the 
police station for processing.178  One hour later, one of the officers 
returned to the apartment and sought consent from Rojas to search 
the home.179  Rojas gave the officer both oral and written consent to 
search, and, as a result of the search, the officer obtained incriminating 
 
 168  Id.  
 169  Id.  
 170  Id. 
 171  Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130. 
 172  Id. 
 173  Rojas explained to the police that she had been in a fight.  In addition, the 
police observed that “[h]er face was red,” that “she had a large bump on her nose,” 
and that there was “blood on her shirt and hand.”  Id.  
 174  Id. 
 175  See generally Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) (“The Fourth 
Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-
home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific 
and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger 
to those on the arrest scene.”). 
 176  Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130. 
 177  Id.  
 178  Id. 
 179  Id. 
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evidence of Fernandez’s involvement in the robbery reported earlier.180 
Fernandez was charged with a number of offenses related to the 
seized evidence, and he moved to suppress the evidence obtained in 
the consent search.181  The trial court denied his motion, and the 
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the basis that 
Fernandez was not a physically present objector at the time of 
consent.182  Fernandez thought he knew his rights when he challenged 
the officers’ request to search.  At the Supreme Court, the Justices 
sought to clear up the dispute between what appeared to be two 
conflicting co-occupants.  Does no trump yes here? 
At first blush, the Fernandez case appeared to resolve an issue that 
was contemplated from dicta in Randolph; namely, whether the 
protections of disputed consent in Randolph should extend to a 
situation where the police removed an objecting co-occupant and later 
sought consent from a remaining co-occupant.183  Instead, the Court 
refused to expand the “narrow exception”184 of Randolph to the 
Fernandez facts.185  Justice Alito, writing for the majority, held “that an 
occupant who is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in 
the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for any other reason.”186  
The majority concluded that Fernandez was not present when Rojas 
gave consent, and, therefore, Randolph did not apply.187 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion continued to apply the privacy test 
of “widely shared social expectations” that was first announced in 
Randolph.188  In addressing Fernandez’s contentions that he made an 
 
 180  Id. at 1130–31. 
 181  Id. at 1131. 
 182  Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130. 
 183  See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121–22 (2006) (addressing the “fine 
line” drawn by the majority decision and noting that “[s]o long as there is no evidence 
that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for 
the sake of avoiding a possible objection, there is practical value in the simple clarity 
of complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant’s permission when there is no 
fellow occupant on hand, the other according dispositive weight to the fellow 
occupant’s contrary indication when he expresses it”).  
 184  Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1133 (recognizing that Randolph provided a narrow 
exception to the rule that “consent by one resident of jointly occupied premises is 
generally sufficient to justify a warrantless search”). 
 185  See id. at 1134 (distinguishing that the dicta in Randolph “should not be read to 
suggest that improper motive may invalidate objectively justified removal”). 
 186  Id. The Court’s decision was based upon a 6-3 vote, with Chief Justice Roberts, 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Breyer joining Justice Alito’s majority opinion.  
Justices Scalia and Thomas filed concurring opinions.  Justice Ginsburg wrote a 
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. 
 187  See id. 
 188  Id. at 1135. 
BOYD (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2015  11:22 AM 
24 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
objection while physically present and that his objection should 
continue after his removal, Justice Alito relied upon social 
expectations of the “caller” in Randolph.189  This rationale is derived 
from the idea that a “caller standing at the door of shared premises 
would have no confidence that one occupant’s invitation was a 
sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood there 
saying, ‘stay out.’”190  Justice Alito distinguished the potential “caller” 
in Randolph from the one in Fernandez because the “objecting tenant 
was not standing at the door,” and “when the objector is not on the 
scene (and especially when it is known that the objector will not return 
during the course of the visit), the friend or visitor is much more likely 
to accept the invitation to enter.”191 
Although Justice Alito steered the majority analysis in the case of 
disputed consent onto the well-worn path of privacy scrutiny, Justice 
Scalia, however, blazed a new trail away from Randolph toward a 
property-based understanding.  In a brief concurrence, Justice Scalia 
disputed the claims, contained in the amicus brief of the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, that Fernandez “had a right 
under property law to exclude the police.”192  And for at least the third 
time in the past two years of the decisional law of the Court, Justice 
Scalia ushered a trespass test into the fray: this time in cases of disputed 
consent.  In his concurrence, he reiterated the property-based inquiry, 
born from his opinions of Jones and Jardines, and examined the issue of 
whether the police committed a trespass when they entered the 
apartment upon the consent of a co-occupant.193 
Justice Scalia contemplated the possibility of a disputed analysis 
in Fernandez: would the dual tests for a search account for opposite 
conclusions?  On the one hand, he joined the majority’s “faithful 
application of Randolph.”194  On the other hand, Justice Scalia identified 
the potential problem of disputed consent analysis and maintained 
that he “would therefore find this a more difficult case if it were 
established that property law did not give petitioner’s co[-]tenant the 
right to admit visitors over petitioner’s objection.”195  While he 
acknowledged that there was “limited authority” for examination on 
 
 189  Id. (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 113 (2006)). 
 190  Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1135. 
 191  Id. 
 192  Id. at 1137 (Scalia, J., concurring).   
 193  Id. at 1137–38. 
 194  But see id. at 1137 (stating that Justice Scalia believed Randolph “was wrongly 
decided”). 
 195  Id. at 1137–38 (emphasis added).  
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this position, he explicated, “[t]hat difficulty does not arise, however, 
because the authorities cited by the amicus association fail to establish 
that a guest would commit a trespass if one of two joint tenants invited 
the guest to enter and the other tenant forbade the guest to do so.”196 
For Justice Scalia, his dilemma was solved in Fernandez.  There was 
no crisis of disputed analysis in the context of disputed consent.  Both 
paths of search law, privacy and property, came to the same 
destination: the police acted reasonably under the Fourth 
Amendment.  While the other Justices failed to address the property 
concerns in their decisions and opinions,197 the shadow of trespass still 
looms large.  Given the current makeup of the Court, and given Justice 
Scalia’s restoration of the trespass test, have we arrived at an arrested 
development?  Is there room for consistent application of both tests?  
If the answer is no, where do we go from here? 
III. ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT: HAS THE COURT ARRESTED OUR 
UNDERSTANDING OF SEARCH LAW BY ITS ADHERENCE TO THE DUAL 
TESTS FOR A SEARCH? 
“Yet knowing how way leads on to way, I doubted if I should ever come 
back.”198 
 
With the exception of Justice Scalia’s concurrence, there is little, 
if any, mention of the trespass test found in the written words of the 
Justices from Fernandez.  Assuredly, however, the property-based test 
was not forgotten.  Prior to oral arguments, the attorneys of record and 
the various amici struggled with how to apply both privacy and property 
rationales to their respective positions.  In briefs filed to the Court 
from both sides, the attorneys sought to demonstrate that, no matter 
what standard the Court employed, their side would prevail.199  Even at 
 
 196  Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1138 (Justice Scalia added “what limited authority there 
is on the subject points to the opposite conclusion.”).  
 197  Id. at 1138–44 (Justice Thomas filed a separate concurrence, maintaining his 
objections over the Randolph decision.  He urged the application of Chief Justice 
Roberts’s “assumption of the risk” dissent in Randolph as the proper rationale.  Justice 
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, filed a dissenting opinion, calling 
for “straightforward application of Randolph.”).  
 198  See FROST, supra note 1, at 9. 
 199  See, e.g., Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 17, Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 
(2014) (No. 12-7822), 2013 WL 4072519, at *17 (“Whether viewed through the lens of 
property law or common sense, the result is the same: The prior objection of one co-
tenant renders a later invitation from another ineffective.”).  See also Respondent’s 
Brief on the Merits at 29, Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014) (No. 12-
7822), 2013 WL 5400266, at *29 (“[G]enerally accepted principles of property law 
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oral arguments, the Justices considered the import of property law 
upon their deliberations.200  Trespass is alive.  Questions concerning 
the continuing vitality and prominence remain to be answered. 
While it is clear that Justice Scalia is the chief originator of the 
resurgence of the property-based test for a search, he has had 
companions to join him, as seen through the decisions of Jones and 
Jardines.201  His concurrence in Fernandez establishes an attempt to 
advance forward a property-based intrusion inquiry.  Using the notion 
of a property interest in trespass as our guide, is Justice Scalia correct 
in stating the police may enter the home on the basis of consent of one 
co-occupant in spite of the objection of another co-occupant?  If Justice 
Scalia is right, then is Randolph wrongly decided, at least in terms of a 
reasonable search under trespass?  If Justice Scalia’s reasoning creates 
the potential inconsistent application of search law, what does the legal 
landscape hold for future decisions? 
As a starting point, Justice Kennedy may have been right when he 
stated at oral arguments: “There’s just not a lot of help in property 
law.”202  This statement may be appropriate for at least three reasons.  
First, the Court has had a troubled history defining and specifically 
articulating how property relates, if at all, to a search inquiry.  The 
Court has stated the Fourth Amendment is “not limited by the law of 
property”203 and property is “not the sole measure of Fourth 
Amendment violations.”204  Of course the Court in Katz went so far as 
to proclaim that trespass is no longer applicable.205  Yet, the Court has 
also declared with equal force that the Fourth Amendment “reflects its 
 
support Rojas’s right to admit visitors of her choice in petitioner’s absence; and the 
common law would preclude an action for trespass against such visitors.”). 
 200  See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
1126 (2014) (No. 12-7822), 2013 WL 6908199, at *48.  Justice Kennedy questioned 
Joseph Palmore, attorney for the United States, as amicus curiae for respondent, about 
property law, and stated: “I think the property law cases that you cite, pages 2425 of 
your brief, I had thought originally that this would be the principal focus of our 
decisions in these cases, but it’s—it’s marginally in your favor.  It’s not really very 
strong.  I mean, you have an 1839 North Carolina case and the CJS case.  There’s just 
not a lot of help in property law.”  Id.  
 201  See Benjamin J. Priester, Five Answers and Three Questions After United States v. Jones 
(2012), the Fourth Amendment “GPS Case,” 65 OKLA. L. REV. 491, 508–10 (2013) (detailing 
Justice Scalia’s “inability to hold votes for his analysis” previously and questioning 
whether Justice Scalia can maintain support for the trespass analysis in Jones).  
 202  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 200.  
 203  See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 110 (2006). 
 204  See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting Soldal v. Cook 
Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992)). 
 205  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
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close connection to property”206 and that common law trespass analysis 
is the foundation that the “Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test 
has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory 
test.”207 
Second, despite this undecided importance of trespass, even 
when it is considered, the Court does not precisely resolve how the 
rules of property (or tort, for that matter) are to be administered.  Even 
if property law is utilized, how close will it follow prior Fourth 
Amendment understandings? Exactly what kind of trespass test is being 
exercised, and does it depend on the type of protected interest?208 
Finally, in the context of the disputed consent cases, such as 
Fernandez and Randolph, there may not be a lot of help with property 
law, specifically as it relates to how property rights may affect consent 
to enter by a co-occupant over the express refusal of another co-
occupant.209  In his concurrence in Fernandez, even Justice Scalia 
conceded that there is “limited authority” on the subject.210  In light of 
this dearth of evidence, is it even possible to conclude whether or not 
the police committed trespass in a disputed consent case?  What 
follows is but one attempt to respond to that question. 
A. Justice Scalia’s View of Trespass: All You Need Is Yes? 
Through the recent opinions of Justice Scalia, we get a picture of 
the winding path that leads to the law of trespass under the Fourth 
Amendment.  What has evolved over time is a three-part inquiry.  First, 
a governmental trespass, as understood by Justice Scalia, is established 
when there is a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
 
 206  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 207  Id. at 952. 
 208  See Kerr, supra note 18, at 91 (suggesting that the Jones trespass test “tracks the 
common law doctrine most directly suited to each of the four constitutionally 
protected areas,” such as “trespass to land for acts concerning houses, trespass to 
chattels for acts concerning papers and effects, and trespass to the person for acts 
concerning persons”). 
 209  See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1138 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 210  See id. (Addressing the claims of an amicus brief that a guest would commit 
trespass in the case of disputed consent, Justice Scalia stated, “[i]ndeed, what limited 
authority there is on the subject points to the opposite conclusion.”).  But see Brief of 
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, supra note 199, at *18.  This amicus brief cited 2 HERBERT. THORNDIKE 
TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 457 (3d ed. 1939) for the 
proposition that “each joint tenant is entitled to possession of the whole, each is 
enabled to defend the estate against strangers.”  That same authority recognized that 
“there is little authority” in this area.  
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area,211 enumerated under the Fourth Amendment212 (“persons, 
houses, papers, and effects”).213  In the case of governmental intrusion, 
the house is considered as the single greatest zone of protection.214  
Trespass alone, however, is not actionable.  Second, there must exist a 
trespass by the police, coupled with “an attempt to find something or 
to obtain information.”215  Finally, a “search” is recognized when the 
government commits an “unlicensed”216 physical intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area for the purpose of gathering 
information. 
Of course, the problem in determining whether there is a search 
in the disputed consent cases is whether the government committed 
an “unlicensed physical intrusion” when it entered the home over the 
objection of a physically present co-occupant.  In answering this 
indispensible question, Justice Scalia provides little explication.  In his 
opinion in Jardines, he suggested a “background social norms” 
framework established the creation of an implied license.217  
Specifically, Justice Scalia was concerned that the police were not 
licensed to walk up to the front porch of a house with a drug-detection 
dog for the purposes of obtaining evidence of illegality.218  For Justice 
Scalia, “the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front 
door do not invite the visitor to conduct a search.”219 
In addition, while describing licenses as either express or implied, 
Justice Scalia demonstrated that the scope of a license “is limited not 
only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose.”220  
Notwithstanding the facts of Jardines dealing with the question of an 
implied license, Justice Scalia considered the circumstances of consent 
 
 211  But see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (concluding that there was 
no search under the Fourth Amendment even though the government committed a 
common-law trespass on what has been called an “open field”). 
 212  Justice Scalia explained that the Oliver decision was correctly decided under 
trespass law because “an open field, unlike the curtilage of a home, is not one of those 
protected areas enumerated in the Fourth Amendment.  See United States v. Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012). 
 213  See id. at 950.  
 214  See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (“[T]he home is first among 
equals.”).  
 215  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951. 
 216  See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. 
 217  Id. (“‘A license may be implied from the habits of the country,’ notwithstanding 
the ‘strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a close.’”) (quoting McKee 
v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922)). 
 218  Id. at 1416.  
 219  Id.  
 220  Id.  
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to explain in dicta the limitation of a license’s scope.221  Although 
Justice Scalia connected consent to that of an express license, he failed 
to offer any further clue as to its meaning or application. 
The idea of consent as a license to trespass does not appear again 
until Scalia’s Fernandez concurrence.  There, instead of citing to the 
idea of “background social norms,” Justice Scalia formulated his 
license argument upon a more traditional property foundation of 
creation and revocation of licenses between co-occupants.  He 
proposed that the consent of a co-occupant created an express 
license.222  While he acknowledged the scant amount of authority to 
address the situation before the Court, Justice Scalia quoted a portion 
of a provision from the secondary source, Corpus Juris Secundum, that 
seemed to address the issue precisely223: 
It is ordinarily held that a tenant in common may properly 
license a third person to enter on the common property.  
The licensee, in making an entry in the exercise of his or her 
license, is not liable in trespass to nonconsenting co[-]tenants, 
particularly in the absence of excessive or negligent use of 
the right granted and in the absence of fraud in procuring 
the license.224 
In spite of the fact that Justice Scalia mentioned conflicting secondary 
source authority, cited by an amicus brief that suggested an “opposite 
view” to his concurrence, he quickly dismissed it by noting that the 
source conceded “there is little authority” on the topic.225  What Justice 
Scalia lacked in analysis on this issue, he made up for in his 
unambiguous claim that “[t]here . . . is no basis for us to conclude that 
the police infringed on any property right of [Fernandez]’s when they 
entered the premises with his co[-]tenant’s consent.”226 
If we were to take Justice Scalia at his word in the Fernandez 
concurrence, it would seem that, despite the objections of Fernandez, 
consent to police entry of the home by Rojas, the co-occupant, would 
amount to a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.  
 
 221  Justice Scalia explored the hypothetical of the police receiving and obtaining 
the consent of an automobile driver to search the vehicle for evidence relating to an 
anonymous tip that there is a body in the trunk. He went on to say that the consent to 
search “does not permit the officer to rummage through the trunk for narcotics.” Id. 
 222  See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1138 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 223  Id.  
 224  86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 144 (2006) (emphasis added) (citing Dinsmore 
v. Renfroe, 225 P. 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924); Williams v. Brunton, 113 S.E. 319 (S.C. 
1922); Mason v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 50 S.E. 782 (S.C. 1905)).  
 225  Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1138 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 226  Id.  
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Irrespective of the issue of whether a co-occupant was a physically 
present objector, the only concern is whether any co-occupant 
consented to a physical entry.  In other words, under a trespass-based 
inquiry for a search in cases of disputed consent, yes will trump no. 
If Justice Scalia is right about this rule, it would appear that the 
Randolph decision would reach in an inconsistent and divergent 
outcome if it were decided under the trespass test, as opposed to the 
privacy test of “shared social expectations.”  Much like the question of 
whether no trumps yes in disputed consent cases, the new question for 
the post-Jones Court will be whether no trumps yes in cases of disputed 
search analysis (privacy vs. property).227  In other words, would the Court 
hold that a police search was reasonable with respect to one test, but 
unreasonable with respect to the other? 
B. It’s Not Just About You (or the Police), It’s About Me: Co-Occupants 
and the Right to Exclude Under Trespass 
There is, however, authority beyond Justice Scalia’s concurrence 
in Fernandez to suggest that a co-occupant may, in fact, grant a license 
to enter over the objections of another co-occupant.  Under existing 
property theory, a co-occupant may give consent (a license) to another 
for entry or use of the property of a shared dwelling, so long as the 
other co-occupant is not dispossessed of his rights in the property.  The 
licensee would not be liable in trespass, because the licensee stands in 
the shoes of the consenting co-occupant.  By the co-occupant’s grant 
of the license, the licensee enjoys the same benefit to enter the 
property, similar to the co-occupant grantor.  What follows below is an 
attempt to advance Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Fernandez. 
Initially, when considering the law of trespass, there are a variety 
of legal disciplines one could consider (property, tort, criminal law, 
etc.).  While there is a convergence of ideas on the subject of trespass, 
the law of property has been consistently utilized by the Court to 
provide guidance on the topic of search law under the Fourth 
Amendment.  When considering an individual’s property rights, 
including the question of whether a co-occupant may refuse entry of a 
guest, careful consideration must be given to the origin and nature of 
 
 227  But see Kerr, supra note 18, at 97 (“Jones bifurcates the search inquiry, but it may 
do so without changing the results in many (or even any) cases.”).  
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property.228  What is property? 229  What rights are conferred under it? 
Although there are many ways to think about property, the 
Supreme Court has focused principally on the rights of exclusion, 
possession, use, and disposition to comprise the “bundle of sticks” that 
is property.230  Of these, the right to exclude has been characterized as 
the “sine qua non”231 in defining property.232  It would seem that the very 
existence of property is tied to the ability to exclude others.233  To the 
causal eye, if the right to exclude was understood simply in terms of 
denying an individual from the property, then it would suggest that an 
objecting co-occupant could refuse entry onto his property and that 
the rule in disputed consent cases should be that no trumps yes.  Thus, 
the rule in Randolph would be reaffirmed under a property analysis. 
The fallacy in that suggestion, however, ignores the proper 
context of how the right to exclude applies.  This is particularly true as 
it relates to the conception of property between co-occupants, each 
holding sticks within their bundle.  To be sure, the question should be 
framed in terms of an individual’s relationship to the property.  In 
situations involving co-occupants similar to those in Randolph and 
Fernandez, however, there must be a careful examination of the 
conjunction between the individuals associated to each other by the 
property.  Here, the paradigm shifts from looking solely at the right 
under the property to the relationship between the parties connected to 
the property.  Focusing on the relationship between co-occupants of a 
property interest, and how their relationship affects their rights to 
property, demonstrates how the law of trespass operates concerning 
each co-occupant. 
More importantly, though, it is this relationship between co-
occupants that explains how their rights are affected when a non-
owner third-party is involved with the property.  Between individuals234 
 
 228  See Michael B. Kent & Lance McMillian, The World of Deadwood: Property Rights 
and the Search for Human Identity, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY. L.J. 489, 505 (2011) 
(“Despite this seeming importance, property’s precise origins, along with its proper 
definition, have long been a subject matter of intense debate.”). 
 229  See generally Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 
ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2003). 
 230  See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). 
 231  See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 
(1998). 
 232  See id. at 740 (“[I]f one starts with the right to exclude, it is possible to derive 
most of the other attributes commonly associated with property . . . .”).  
 233  See id. at 730 (“Give someone the right to exclude others from a valued resource, 
i.e., a resource that is scarce relative to the human demand for it, and you give them 
property.  Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have property.”). 
 234  I have used the term “occupant” or “co-occupant” throughout this Article to 
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who share an interest in property, the general rule is clear that a co-
occupant may not maintain a trespass action against another co-
occupant.235  The motivation supporting this rule is premised upon the 
understanding that the co-occupants are each entitled to the 
possession, entry, and use of the entire premises.236  Since both co-
occupants have a present property interest that grants them the right 
to possess and use, the co-occupants stand on equal footing and may 
not exclude the other.  Essentially, the co-tenant’s relationship to the 
other, with respect to the property, precludes the right to exclude a co-
tenant in trespass. 
The only exception to the prohibition of a trespass action is when 
the balance of the relationship between co-occupants has been 
significantly altered, amounting to ouster.  Ouster “is the wrongful 
dispossession or exclusion by one tenant of his co[-]tenant or co[-
]tenants from the common property of which they are entitled to 
possession.”237  In order to prove ouster, there must exist more than 
 
describe the relationship between two individuals who possess “common authority” 
over the property.  See supra note 11.  In many of the cases and examples that follow, 
however, the various courts will use the terms such as “co-tenant,” “tenant in common,” 
“co-owner,” etc. to describe the parties involved.  For purposes of our analysis, the 
distinction between the interests is not determinative to our understanding under this 
section.   
 235  See, e.g., Williams v. Jader Fuel Co., Inc., 944 F.2d 1388, 1399 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(“Illinois does not permit tenants in common to sue each other for trespass.”) 
(citations omitted); Conklin v. Newman, 115 N.E. 849, 851 (Ill. 1917) (“It is elementary 
that one tenant in common cannot be guilty of committing a trespass upon property 
which he owns in common with another.”); Davis v. Polard, 66 A. 380, 382 (Me. 1906) 
(“It is a general rule of law that a tenant in common cannot maintain an action of 
trespass quare clausum against his co-tenant.”) (citations omitted); Mueller v. Allen, 
128 P.3d 18, 24 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]respass cannot ordinarily be maintained by 
one co-owner of real property against another for such acts as merely entering the 
property, or the like.”) (citation omitted).  
 236  See, e.g., Struzinski v. Struzinsky, 52 A.2d 2, 4 (Conn. 1947) (“Ordinarily 
possession of one tenant in common is possession of all.”) (citations omitted); Jemzura 
v. Jemzura, 330 N.E.2d 414, 419 (N.Y. 1975) (“[A] tenant in common has the right to 
take and occupy the whole of the premises and preserve them from waste or injury, so 
long as he or she does not interfere with the right of a co[-]tenant to also occupy the 
premises.”) (citations omitted); Gillmor v. Gillmor, 694 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1984) 
(“A tenant in common has the right to use and occupy the entire property held in co[-
]tenancy without liability to other co[-]tenants.”); Mueller, 128 P.3d at 24 (“[E]ach co[-
]tenant has a legal right to enter upon and enjoy the common property . . . .”) (citation 
omitted).  See also 2 HERBERT. THORNDIKE TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, THE LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY § 426 (rev. 3d ed. Supp. 2012) (“Each co[-]tenant has a right to enter upon, 
explore and possess the entire premises, and to do so without the consent of his co[-
]tenants, though he may not do so to the exclusion of his co[-]tenants to do likewise.”) 
(citation omitted).  
 237  See, e.g., Zaslow v. Kroenert, 176 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1946).  See also 86 C.J.S. Tenancy 
in Common § 108 (2006) (stating “an action for trespass may arise against a co[-]tenant 
who has actually ousted another.”).  
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the mere exclusive use or possession by a co-occupant over another.238  
Under ouster, a co-occupant attempts to unlawfully exercise his right 
to exclude a co-occupant that shares an interest in the property.  In 
these situations, the excluded co-occupant may obtain an action for 
trespass.239 
While it is clear that co-occupants may not be liable for trespass, 
what happens when a third-party, who maintains no property interest, 
attempts to enter the property?  Ordinarily, a co-occupant may exclude 
the individual from the property.240  At the heart of the disputed 
consent cases of Randolph and Fernandez, however, is the question: what 
happens if one of the co-occupants invites the third-party to enter the 
property, over the objection of the other co-occupant?  Can the 
objecting co-occupant exclude the third-party?  Whose property rights 
control?  In other words, can a co-occupant assert his right to exclude 
under trespass, despite another co-occupant’s invitation to enter?  As 
before, the question remains whether no will trump yes. 
As a starting point, a co-occupant’s right to exclude is nuanced 
and far from absolute.241  Indeed, as Professor Merrill explained, there 
exists “a qualified complex of exclusion rights, in which owners 
exercise relatively full exclusion rights with respect to certain kinds of 
intrusion (e.g., by strangers) but highly qualified or even nonexistent 
exclusion rights with respect to other kinds of intrusions (e.g., low-level 
nuisances).”242  One such “nonexistent exclusion right” exists in the 
context of a license.243  A license has been described as a “waiver of the 
 
 238  See Gillmor, 694 P.2d at 1040; see also Willis v. Mann, 386 S.E.2d 68, 71 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1989) (Ouster “involves ‘an entry or possession of one tenant in common that 
enables a co[-]tenant to bring ejectment against him[,]’” and the “entry or possession 
must be a clear, positive, and unequivocal act equivalent to an open denial of [the co[-
]tenant’s] right and to putting him out of the seizin.”) (citations omitted). 
 239  See Mueller, 128 P.3d at 24 (“An action for trespass, however, ‘may arise against 
a co[-]tenant who has actually ousted another.’”) (citations omitted).  See also Harman 
v. Gartman, 16 S.C.L. (Harp.) 430, 432 (1824) (Gantt, J., dissenting) (“It is admitted, 
that where there is an ouster, the converse of the rule holds good, that trespass may be 
maintained.”); 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 108 (2006) (stating that a trespass action 
“may arise against a co[-]tenant who has actually ousted another”). 
 240  See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) 
(“The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured 
strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”). 
 241  See Merrill, supra note 231, at 753 (describing “a complex tapestry of property 
rights of different sorts (private, public, common) with different types and degrees of 
exclusion rights being exercised by different sorts of entities in different contexts”). 
 242  Id. 
 243  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919–20 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a license as “[a] 
personal privilege to do some particular act or series of acts on land without possessing 
any estate or interest therein, and is ordinarily revocable at the will of the licensor and 
is not assignable”).  
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right to exclude.”244  Specifically, a license is “an authority given to do 
some one act, or series of acts, on the land of another, without passing 
any estate in the land,”245 and may include permission to enter upon 
the property.246  When a co-occupant grants a license to a non-owner, 
the third-party may enter the property lawfully without fear of 
committing trespass.247 
So how can it be that an objecting co-occupant, who has a present 
interest in the property, cannot exclude under trespass a mere licensee, 
who has no property interest?  The answer pivots upon the relationship 
between those who have the property interest: the co-occupants.  Just 
as the co-occupants may not assert a trespass claim, absent ouster, 
against one another, neither may the objecting co-occupant bring a 
trespass suit against the licensee.  In essence, the licensee, by having 
permission to enter the property by one co-occupant, has the same 
protection as the licensor against exclusion from another co-occupant.  
The licensee “stands in the shoes” of the licensor and cannot be 
excluded under trespass. 
 This theory that the licensee stands in the shoes of the licensor is 
exemplified in the case of Buchanan v. Jencks.248  In Buchanan, the 
plaintiff, along with several other individuals as tenants in common, 
held a property interest in a five-acre wood lot.249  One of the other 
tenants sold his interest in the timber, and the buyer then conferred 
upon the defendant the right to cut and remove the wood.250  After the 
defendant entered the property and removed the timber from the lot, 
the plaintiffs (other co-tenants of the lot) brought an action against 
the defendant for trespass and the unlawful removal of the wood.251  
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated the rule that a co-tenant may 
not commit trespass against another co-tenant, absent ouster.252  The 
court went on to explain that the licensor, who was a tenant in 
common, had a right to enter the property without committing 
 
 244  See Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 884 (2014). 
 245  See Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. 533, 537–38 (1814) (stating that a license 
“amount[s] to nothing more than an excuse for the act, which would otherwise be a 
trespass”). 
 246  See Causee v. Anders, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 388, 389 (1839).  See also, 2 
HERBERT. THORNDIKE TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 432 (3d ed. 
1939). 
 247  See Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N.Y. 31, 42 (1881) (explaining that a license “only 
makes an action lawful, which, without it, had been unlawful”). 
 248  96 A. 307 (R.I. 1916). 
 249  Id. at 308. 
 250  Id. 
 251  Id. 
 252  Id. at 309. 
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trespass.253  When it described the rights of the defendant licensee, the 
court declared: 
We see no reason why a co[-]tenant in the enjoyment of his 
rights as such cannot authorize another to do whatever he might 
lawfully do himself.  A contrary view, if followed to its logical 
conclusion, would restrict a co[-]tenant’s enjoyments of the 
common property to the sphere of his own personal activities 
and would deprive him of the aid of others whom he might 
desire or need to employ.254 
The rationale that a licensee may “do whatever [the licensor] 
might lawfully do himself” was reiterated later in the Buchanan 
opinion, when the court described the licensee as “standing in the place 
of a co[-]tenant.”255  The court went on to hold that the defendant 
licensee could not be liable in trespass to the other co-tenants.256  In 
addition, other cases have reinforced the reasoning of “standing in the 
place” from Buchanan.257 
Based upon the relationships of co-occupants and the rights 
relating to property of a shared domicile, there is evidence to conclude 
that a licensee, like that of the police officers in Randolph and 
Fernandez, would have the same rights of entry into the home as the co-
occupant licensor.  If that is the case, then the objecting co-occupant 
may not allege that the police committed a trespass.  In fact, the 
 
 253  Id. 
 254  Buchanan, 96 A. at 309. (emphasis added).  
 255  Id. at 309–10 (emphasis added).  
 256  Id. at 310–11 (“But a co[-]tenant cannot be said to be guilty of a trespass quare 
clausum fregit for the reason that he has, in common with his co[-]tenants, a right to 
enter upon the premises, and such entry does not constitute a trespass.  Neither could 
the defendant be guilty of trespass in entering the close because he entered upon the 
authority of Thayer who was a co[-]tenant with the plaintiffs.”). 
 257  In Causee v. Anders, the defendant, a tenant in common, assaulted the plaintiff 
(who had no property interest), knocking out three teeth, when the plaintiff and 
another tenant in common entered the property.  The plaintiff asserted the defendant 
could not “treat [plaintiff] in the manner proven” since the plaintiff “was there under 
the authority” of another tenant in common.  The defendant argued there was a 
“distinction between the tenant in common and one who, like the plaintiff, was there 
by the authority of his co-tenant.”  The trial court determined that defendant’s 
position was “not supported by law” and the appellate court subsequently affirmed the 
result.  See 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 388, 388–89 (1839).  See also Dinsmore v. 
Renfroe, 225 P. 886, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924) (explaining that a tenant in common 
may by license “confer upon another person the right to occupy and use the property 
of the cotenancy as fully as such lessor . . . himself might have used or occupied it”); 
Williams v. Bruton, 113 S.E. 319, 325 (S.C. 1922) (“[W]here one tenant in common 
has granted a permit or license to a public service corporation to enter and construct 
its line, there is no foundation for an action of trespass in the absence of evidence of 
excessive or negligent use of the right granted.”).  See also 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common 
§ 144 (2006). 
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objecting co-occupant may no more charge trespass against a licensee 
than he could accuse the other co-occupant of trespass.  While any 
person with an interest in the property may have the right to exclude, 
that right is not applicable to other individuals who have an interest in 
the possession and use of the property.  Put another way, a licensee 
may not be excluded since he stands in the shoes of the licensor co-
tenant.  Therefore, using Justice Scalia’s test for a search under the 
property-based analysis, the police committed a licensed physical 
intrusion that amounted to a reasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment.  In the cases of Randolph and Fernandez, the consent of 
the co-occupant granted the police a license to enter, over the protests 
of another co-occupant.  Therefore, under property conceptions, the 
rule in Randolph is turned on its head: yes now trumps no. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the right to exclude, there has 
been some recent discussion among scholars that the right to include 
must be regarded as important in defining the nature of property.258  
Within the framework of a co-occupant granting a third-party a license 
to enter, the grantor waives his right to exclude and, instead, gives the 
individual “a ‘permission slip’ from the owner to a non-owner.”259  If 
the right to include is related to property, it would seem this would be 
yet another reason why a co-occupant may validly license another to 
enter his property.  Under those facts, a dissenting co-occupant should 
not able to thwart another co-occupant’s consent to waive the right to 
exclude.  Permission is given, and any refusal to honor the right to 
include should be denied.  Again, the rule from property is that yes 
trumps no. 
C. Are We There Yet? Some Final Thoughts on the Landscape of the 
Privacy/Trespass Dispute 
It is hard to say exactly where the Court will go in search law 
generally or in disputed consent situations specifically in the post-Jones 
era.  While many questions remain unanswered, at least three concerns 
are worth noting at the present.  First, how will the Justices treat the 
twin tests for search?  In other words, should the Court treat the 
separate tests of property and privacy in the disjunctive (either/or) for 
each dispute?  Or will the Court look to a single test in distinct 
situations?260 
 
 258  See Kelly, supra note 244, at 869 (discussing Penner’s analogy of a property 
owner as a gatekeeper that “can include as well as exclude”).  See also JAMES E. PENNER, 
THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 74 (1997). 
 259   See Kelly, supra note 244, at 884.   
 260  See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (per curiam) 
BOYD (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2015  11:22 AM 
2015] ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT IN SEARCH LAW 37 
There exists evidence for both approaches in the current 
language of the opinions.  Specifically looking at Justice Scalia’s 
language in Jones implies that both inquiries are complementary, in 
that the privacy test “has been added to, not substituted for” a property-
based understanding.261  Later in the opinion, however, Justice Scalia 
declared that trespass should be the exclusive test in cases, like Jones, 
which involve actual physical invasion.262  Justice Scalia noted what he 
called “particularly vexing problems” with the exclusivity of the Katz 
expectations test and concluded that, “we may have to grapple with 
these ‘vexing problems’ in some future case where a classic trespassory 
search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there 
is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.”263  Based upon 
his conclusions in Jones, it appears that Justice Scalia would utilize the 
Katz privacy-based inquiry only in “situations involving merely the 
transmission of electronic signals without trespass.”264 
Although Justice Scalia has established a preference265 for the 
trespass test to the exclusion of the privacy test in the physical invasion 
factual scenarios, other members of the Court have suggested that the 
search may be analyzed under either test.  Justice Kagan, through her 
concurrence in Jardines, exemplifies this view when she stated, “[t]he 
Court today treats this case under a property rubric; I write separately 
to note that I could just as happily have decided it by looking to 
Jardines’[s] privacy interests.”266  Of course, some members of the 
Court disagree with the current utilization of the trespass test to resolve 
issues of search.267 
In light of this ambiguity, created by the reintroduction of the 
trespass test, the current problem before the Court is the lack of 
guidance essential to help predict readily administrable search rules 
for a given factual scenario.  Which test controls, and when, if ever, 
should the other test be viewed?  Of course, the greater problem, as 
explained above, is what happens if the two standards create 
 
(concluding that the satellite-based monitoring of recidivist sex offenders by the 
government is a search “since it [obtains information] by physically intruding on a 
subject’s body”).  
 261  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012). 
 262  Id. at 953–54. 
 263  Id. at 954.  
 264  Id. at 953 (explaining that cases without trespass “would remain subject to Katz 
analysis”). 
 265  See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) (“One virtue of the Fourth 
Amendment’s property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.”). 
 266  Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 267  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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diametrically opposing results? 
A second unanswered question to be considered is what type of 
trespass test has Justice Scalia created from Jones and Jardines?  In 
particular, Justice Scalia’s opinion from Jardines joined notions of 
trespass with those of “background social norms.”268  Justice Ginsburg, 
in her Fernandez dissent, loosely linked Justice Scalia’s “background 
social norms” language to the conception of the pre-Jones “shared 
societal expectations” rationale from the Randolph decision.269  The use 
of “background social norms” in Justice Scalia’s reasoning could be 
viewed as a retreat from a staunch physical intrusion trespass 
examination.  Is Justice Scalia reading a societal expectations 
requirement into his trespass test?  To put it another way, is he 
morphing his analysis into a privacy/property blend?  While this may 
not be the case, it nonetheless underscores the shifting sand the Court 
stands upon in its case-by-case decisional law under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Finally, it bears discussing the significant impact the issue of 
domestic violence plays in the disputed consent cases of Randolph and 
Fernandez.  The Randolph majority drew considerable fire for its rule 
that no trumps yes for consent to police searches, in part due to fear 
that the rule operated to prevent the police from assisting potential 
victims of domestic abuse.270  The Randolph majority, however, rebuked 
the allegations and offered that the police could, in fact, lawfully enter 
over the objections of a co-occupant in established exigent 
circumstances, such as a domestic violence situation.271  In Fernandez, 
however, the Court encountered the very situation contemplated in 
Randolph: the present plight of domestic violence, involving an 
objector suspected of committing the crime.272 
Rather than address the concerns raised by both majority and 
dissenting opinions in Randolph, the Fernandez Court refused to apply 
the rule in Randolph.273  Instead of attempting to faithfully adhere to 
the physically present objector rule (no trumps yes in disputed 
consent), the Court determined Fernandez was a “very different 
 
 268  See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416–17. 
 269  See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1140–41 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 270  See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 139 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“The majority’s rule apparently forbids police from entering to assist with a domestic 
dispute if the abuser whose behavior prompted the request for police assistance 
objects.”). 
 271  Id. at 118 (majority opinion). 
 272  Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130. 
 273  Id.  
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situation.”274  And while there appears to be no doubt as to the officers’ 
determination that there was sufficient probable cause to arrest 
Fernandez on suspicion of domestic abuse, the majority opinion’s 
endeavor to create an exception under these facts represents a slight 
of hand.  Fernandez was present at the home at the time of the police 
officers’ first encounter, and he strenuously refused consent to 
search.275  Is the Court allowing the image of the bloody and bruised 
victim of domestic violence to cloud its prior decision from Randolph?  
To put it another way, are the unsightly facts present in Fernandez 
contributing to a poorly decided rationale? 
Alternatively, could it be that Randolph was erroneous decided?  Is 
it possible Randolph is wrong, both in terms of the property- and 
privacy-based standards?  In that case, there is no discord.  There is no 
disputed analysis.  Of course, that is not the current state of the law, 
but how could the Court get there? 
Under a Jones trespass analysis as presented in Parts II, III.A, and 
III.B above, the Court could determine that Janet Randolph effectively 
gave the police, by her consent to the officers, a license to enter the 
home.  As a result of her granting of the license to enter, the police 
could not be found liable in trespass, despite the objections of a co-
occupant.  In essence, the police would stand in the shoes of the 
grantor, Janet Randolph, and would be entitled to protection.  Because 
the officers are not trespassers, the search of the home on the basis of 
her consent would be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  In 
the context of the current state of the law, it appears that the property-
based inquiry most effectively addresses the domestic violence 
concerns raised by the Randolph and Fernandez decisions.  Additionally, 
resolving the case under trespass prevents the Court from contorting 
its reasoning under the privacy-based test, similar to what it did in 
Fernandez. 
Even under privacy-based concerns, the Court could reach a 
similar holding that the search was reasonable by utilizing a Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy query.  Instead of relying on “shared 
social expectations,” which often reduce our Court to argue to impasse 
over whether it is acceptable or not for the “hypothetical caller” to 
come in, the Court should return to earlier traditions that hold that 
when an individual shares information or a living space, he assumes 
 
 274  Id. 
 275  Id. at 1141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Does an occupant’s refusal to consent 
lose force as soon as she absents herself from the doorstep, even if only for a moment?  
Are the police free to enter the instant after the objector leaves the door to retire for 
a nap, answer the phone, use the bathroom, or speak to another officer outside?”). 
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the risk of a diminished expectation of privacy.276  But, that is not 
currently the law in the context of disputed consent.  For now, 
Randolph controls, except when the Court says it does not, as it did in 
Fernandez. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
“Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—I took the one less traveled by, and 
that has made all the difference.”277 
 
The current reality is deadlock. The path to understanding 
modern search law is in dispute.  Many have discussed whether we 
should have two tests for a search or whether one test is better than 
another.  Undeniably, each test (privacy or property) has its strengths 
and weaknesses.  When it comes to the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard, a chief complaint is that “[i]t involves a degree of 
circularity, and judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of 
privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person.”278  At the 
same time, the test has been praised for its flexibility to handle a variety 
of situations requiring protection279 as well as its durability over the 
course of history.280 
So was the re-introduction of a property-based understanding a 
better solution to search law?  Ostensibly, the trespass standard is 
attractive in that creates a seemingly bright-line test that “keeps easy 
cases easy.”281  Similar to the Katz test, though, the trespass test has been 
denounced as being “no less circular than the problematic privacy 
analysis.”282  Most importantly is whether the trespass test anachronistic 
 
 276  See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 128 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“If an individual shares 
information, papers, or places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person 
will in turn share access to that information or those papers or places with the 
government.”). 
 277  See FROST, supra note 1, at 9. 
 278  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 279  See Kerr, supra note 52, at 507–08 (explaining that the reasonable expectation 
of privacy standard is not a single test but can be broken down into “four relatively 
distinct categories of argument used to justify whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists”). 
 280  See Kerr, supra note 18 at 94–95 (“The open-ended nature of the Katz test allows 
the Court to pick models based on which best identifies the kinds of troublesome law 
enforcement practices that are in need of regulation.”). 
 281  See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).   
 282  See David Steinberg, Florida v. Jardines: Privacy, Trespass, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 91, 109–10 (2013) (stating that the 
“trespass doctrine does not seem like an improvement over the dominant privacy 
analysis” and that it “would seem to make Fourth Amendment decisions turn on fine 
and trivial factual details”). 
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given the current technological and digital age, where the government 
has the potential to monitor and gather information without ever 
committing a physical intrusion, amounts to an unlawful trespass. 
So how did we arrive at this destination?  In the case of its Fourth 
Amendment pronouncements, the Supreme Court often acts as a 
common-law court, enlarging and contracting the “rule” as it sees fit, 
given the current controversy presented.  Professor Bradley eloquently 
summed up this point in explaining the Court’s difficulties in its 
Exclusionary Rule precedents: 
The result is that the Court strives to justify such police 
behavior by stretching existing doctrine to accommodate it.  
Herein lies the inherent contradiction, and source of 
confusion, in fourth amendment law: The Court tries on the 
one hand to lay down clear rules for the police to follow in 
every situation while also trying to respond flexibly, or 
“reasonably,” to each case because a hard-line approach 
would lead to exclusion of evidence.  Since the rules are not 
clear and since, even if they were, it is virtually impossible to 
lay down a rule that anticipates all potential cases, the police 
engage in behavior that does not conform to the rules but 
that strikes the Court as having been essentially reasonable.  
Given the Court’s predilection for clear-cut rules, however, 
simply declaring such conduct “reasonable” and leaving it at 
that is not enough.  Instead, the Court offers a detailed 
explanation as to how the police behavior really did conform 
to the old rule (and in so doing, changes the contours of the 
old rule), or creates a new rule to justify the behavior.  
Naturally, such a holding spawns new litigation, which leads 
to a new opinion, which leads to a new rule, etc.283 
Much like the problem of disputed consent, where one co-
occupant says yes and the other says no, we may very well have arrived 
at a place in our Fourth Amendment understanding where disputed 
analysis, trespass or privacy, threatens to cloud an already obscured 
view of search law.  Similar to the contentious and combative couples 
in Randolph and Fernandez, supporters, as well as critics, of the current 
jurisprudence find themselves mired in conflict.  Indeed, we can see 
that “two roads diverged in a wood.”284  It remains unknown, however, 
which road we should follow and will it make “all the difference.”  For 
now, we are marooned to fight over the directions. 
 
 283  See Bradley, supra note 116, at 1470 (footnote omitted).  
 284  See FROST, supra note 1, at 9. 
